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STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its 
ROAD COMMISSION, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
BETTY LeSOURD, a woman, ALEX T. 
DA VIES and THELMA DA VIES, his 
wife, and VALLEY BANK & TRUST 
COMPANY, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
Case No. 
11866 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action in eminent domain. In September 
rn67, the State Road Commission filed its Complaints in the 
District Court of Summit County to condemn a part of 
the larger property of Alex and Thelma Davies and their 
daughter, Betty LeSourd, Respondents herein, said property 
being described in three tracts,1 for the development and 
1 Said parcels, 4:28, 4:28H, and 4:28G, were described by the State 
in its Complaints as being in the ownership of the Davies and LeSourd 
and there was no dispute as to the ownership by these Defendants of 
the same (R. 4, 13). 
2 
construction of Interstate Highway I-80. The appeal herein 
is taken by the State from the Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Judgment of Just Compensation, entered by 
District Judge Swan on April 17, 1969, on claimed errors 
of law. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The owner admitted and the trial Court found that 
the Road Commission was authorized to condemn and that 
the requisite finding of public use and necessity was made 
as Ito .the Respondents' property (R. 49). The case there-
after was set down for trial on the issues of Just Compen-
&ation to be paid to the owners for the expropriation of the 
property condemned and for damages to their remaining 
property caused by the taking and the construction of the 
highway facility (Tr. 2, R. 49). It was not until the first 
day of trial that the State gave any indication that it in-
tended to raise any question as to rtitle of 1the Landowners' 
property (Tr. 14-17, 19-22) .2 
After trial of better than three days on the ownership 
issue and an ensuing three days of trial on the issue of the 
market value of the land and improvements condemned and 
the damages to the remainder, the Court entered Findings 
2While we do not urge any absolute doctrine of waiver by or estop-
pel on the part of the State, it is nonetheless the fact that no notice 
was given to the landowners by the State regarding title in a,ny plead-
ing or pre-trial hearing prior to the commencement of the trial on the 
issues of Just Compensation. This was in full view of the fact that 
the landowners had clearly asserted their ownership and possession in 
and to land remaining and lying outside of the condemned area and 
that the same had been substantially and irreparably damaged ( R. 
30-33); no reply was filed to the Defendants' Answer i.n accordance 
with Rule 7, U.R.C.P., although the circumstances would have sug-
gested that such would have been appropriate. 
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of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Judgment of Just Com-
pensation, pursuant to Rule 52 U.R.C.P. (R. 48-55). 
The Motions of the State for a new trial on the ground 
of errors in law, and alternatively for remittitur were de-
nied by the trial Court on September 10, 1969 (R. 56, 57). 
RELIEF SOUGHT BY STATE ON APPEAL 
The Road Commission herein requests that the Judg-
ment of the trial Court be reversed and that the case be 
remanded for new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
State's counsel has failed to set forth in his Brief the 
facts elicited at the trial which underi.vrite and support 
the Findings, Conclusions and Judgment of Judge Swan. 
Rather, State counsel has given a portrait of only those 
facts relevant to an issue which has been newly invented 
for the purpose of this Appeal, viz., adverse possessfon, a 
subject which did not play even a latent part of the trial 
of the case. Consequently, in order that the Court be 
apprised of the issues framed for trial, of the theory, evi-
dence of these. Landowners and the State on ownership, 
possession and concomitant entitlement to Just Compen-
sation, and Findings and Conclusions upon which the Judg-
ment herein is predicated, Respondents find it necessary 
to make their own statement of the record of trial pursuant 
to 75 (p) (2) U.R.C.P. 
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1. Nature of the Property Prior to Condemnation. 
The total tract3 of the Landowners consltiituted 6.27 acres 
of real property (Tr. 571), upon which were located sub-
stantial commercial improvements consisting of a restau-
rant, service station and cabin area (Tr. 70, 278). The prop-
erty was known throughout the State as the "Kimball 
Junction Cafe and Service Station." Located at the junc-
tion of U.S. Highway 40 and the Snyderville Highway to 
Park City in Summit County (Tr. 586), the property was 
located on a swing corner giving it direct access to U.S. 
Highway 40 and unlimited access to the Park City roadway 
thus serving the traveling public between Salt Lake City 
and Park City, Eastern Utah, Colorado, Wyoming, etc. 
(Tr. 300, 572, 575). That the situs, access, location, actual 
use of the property and potential use in the reasonably 
foreseeable future was for a commercial restaurant, serv-
ice station and tourist development site was undisputed in 
the evidence of both parties (Tr. 383, 502, 575, 621). 
Throughout the years, the restaurant had been sub-
stantially and continually remodeled and upgraded. Cabins 
at the rear of the property were rented year round by tour-
ists, travelers, hunters and fishermen; they too, had been 
completely remodeled (Tr. 287). 
Utilizing the employment of ten to twelve people 
throughout the year on a twenty-four hour basis in the 
operation of the restaurant and service station (Tr. 294-
295), the stJaJtion pumped between 135,000-+- iand 161,000 
3The subject property is portrayed in yellow on the base map of 
trial Exhibit 1 reproduced and attached hereto in this Brief. 
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gallons of gasoline (Tr. 300) and sale from all services were 
in excess of $117,000.00 in the year prior to condemnation. 
Portions of the south and west sections of the property 
were not physically utilized but the highest and best use 
of the same as of September 1967, was 1as a motel site 
(Tr. 305). 
Contrary to the representation of State counsel in his 
Brief, the Defendants' property had not been indiscrimi-
nately used by the public as a thoroughfare, but rather 
served as an entrance to and exit from the commercial 
improvements situated on the larger property (Tr. 109-111). 
2. The Subject Property After Condemnation. 
The State in its Complaint, condemned .42 of an acre 
of land across the entire commercial frontage of the De-
fendants' property, resulting in a total taking of all of the 
landowners' easements and rights of access to U.S. High-
way 40 and the Park City Highway (Tr. 402). The south-
erly edge of the right of way line of the State came within 
less than one foot of the service station pumps on the De-
fendants' property (Tr. 311); the taking ripped out the 
sanitary system and commercial storage tanks and as well 
changed the grade of the remaining property (Tr. 118-
119, 406). 
The remainder property lost its "swing corner influ-
ence" as a result of the expropriation and its sole means 
of access was forsaken for a newly constructed local service 
farm road (Tr. 514, 595, 596). 'Dhe of the prop-
6 
erty for commercial use was substantially impaired as a 
result of the acquisition (Tr. 466, 595). 
As a result of the foregoing, commercial operations on 
the subject property were no longer economically feasible 
and the Landowners were forced to discontinue business 
thereon (Tr. 311, 312). 
The testimony is undisputed on both sides that after 
condemnation, the highest and best use of the subject prop-
erty changed from commercial service station-restaurant 
useage to agriculturail-transitional (Tr. 513). However, the 
appraiser for the State did contend that the remaining 
property could be possibly used for an out-of-the-way "beer 
hall" (Tr. 662). 
3. The Ownership Question. 
At the outset of the trial the State raised, for the first 
time, the issue of ithe Landowners' rtri.tle, claiming that a por-
tion of the remaining property after condemnation was not 
owned by the Defendants (Tr. 14-17, 19-22). After extended 
argument of counsel, the Court set down precise and clear 
procedural guidelines as to how the issue of ownership was 
to be resolved. The Court held that there was an issue of 
lbiitJle, that the Landowners 'had the burden ·af establishing 
a prima facie case with respect thereto and that suck prima 
facie case could be established by evidence indicating that 
the subject property was under quiet and peaceable posses-
sion by the Defendants under claim of ownership and color 
of title (Tr. 57). Judge Swan further determined that if 
the Defendants met such burden, the Road Commission 
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would be responsible for calling witnesses to assert or claim 
an interest in the subject property foreign to that of these 
Defendants (Tr. 57). The establishment of the rule by the 
Court was premised upon the admitted case and treatise 
authority (Tr. 35, 36, 51, 57). 
The State did not register an objection to this ruling, 
nor did it object to the procedure upon which the ruling was 
predicated; nor did it aver or allege that the question of 
adverse possession was the guiding issue (Tr. 57). Rather, 
within the framework of the trial Court's ruling, both the 
Landowners and :tJhe StaJte proceeded to present evidence 
regarding the question of ownership. 
4. Evidence on Ownership. 
(a) The Landowners' evidence. 
The evidence was undisputed tllrat the Landowners, as 
of September 1967, had occupied, possessed, fenced in part, 
improved, and used the subject property of 6.27 acres for 
better than 15 years (Tr. 70, 72, 82-83). During that time, 
no person whomsoever manifested or assented any c1a;im, 
right, title or interest in and to said land (Tr. 82, 90-91). 
And the evidence was that no other individual had used 
or occupied any part of the said premises in a manner in-
consistent with the quiet and peaceable possession of the 
Defendants during the 15 year period. The testimony indi-
cated that it was not unltil 1965 ht these Landowners had 
notice that their record title did not conform to the prop-
erty actually under possession and claim of ownership (Tr. 
73, 82, 85). At that time, the Defendants had the entire 
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property surveyed, documentary title was executed and 
placed on record of the survey description, the County As-
sessor was notified of the same, and the Defendants from 
1965-1967 made payment of real property taxes on the entire 
6.27 acres (Tr. 82, 83, 95, 153). 
(b) The State's evidence. 
The State produced no witnesses claiming or asserting 
any interest or ti,iJle in the subject propecly foreign to the 
interests of these Defendants with the exception of two 
fragmented parcels on each end of the property as to which 
the State, itself, asserted an interest (R. 45) .4 In other 
respects, the State produced only the testimony of an ab-
stractor (Tr. 167) and a Road Commission staff attorney 
(Tr. 219), both of whom limited their testimony to the 
veritable jumble of documentary recordings, inconsistent 
chains of title, overlapping and gapping instruments found 
in the Recorder's office of Summit County. Neither the 
State's abstractor, its title attorney nor any other witness 
made a physical inspection of the property to determine 
possession nor did they talk with any person who claimed 
any inter:est fa ithe properlty foreign to tllese Dand-
owners (Tr. 198, 225-229). The State's title attorney had 
no knowledge or opinion as to any possesory interest in the 
subject property (Tr. 229). The State's evidence further 
indicated that there were no documents of any type specifi-
cally relating to the subject property during the period 
which these Defendants had been in possession which pur-
4Such parcels were excluded by the Court in favor of the State 
from the total tract of these Defendants prior to trial on the issue of 
Just Compensation. 
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ported in any way to divest, encumber or jeopardize the 
interests, c1laims of ownership and documentary recordings 
of the Defendant-"landowners. 
As it turned out, the only property of the 6.27 acres as 
to which the State disputed the ownership of these De-
fendants was a portion of the rearage land. Such property 
involved a difference of but $3,900.00 between the value 
evidence of the State Road Commission and that of the 
Defendants (Tr. 419, 667, 693). 
(c) Additional evidence of ownership. 
At the end of the State's testimony on title, the Sum-
mit County attorney entered his appearance in behalf of 
the County (Tr. 229) and unequivocally stated that as to 
the 6.27 acres under the possesion, claim of ownership and 
color of title of these landowners, Summit County made no 
claim of any right, title or interest in and to the same (Tr. 
230). It was further adduced that former County right-of-
way through the property of these Defendants had not been 
used as a public highway since the late 1930's, that the 
County had not asserted any claim to or use of the same 
since that time, that the same had not been open as a 
right-of-way to the traveling public, that these Defendants 
had continuously occupied, possessed and fenced in part 
such property since 1952 and that in the fall of 1965, the 
County Commission, in open hearing "agreed" to abandon 
the old County right-of-way under the 1927 deed (Tr. 73, 
80-81, 237, 239, 244). 
5. Ruling of Trial Court on Ownership of Property. 
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After submission of all the evidence on ownership, 
the lower Court, consistent with its initial ruling as here-
tofore outlined, determined that the Landowners iherein had 
met their burden of proof of establishing a prima facie case 
of ownership of the 6.27 acres shown in yellow on Exhibit 
1, that the Road Commission had not overcome that prima 
facie showing by the introduction of any evidence of as-
serted claims or interests in said land foreign to the pos-
session, interest, and ownership of these Defendants and 
that accordingly, the 6.27 acres was to be considered for 
the purposes of condemnation, as being that of these De-
fendants (Tr. 267). The trial Court further concluded 
that the Road Commission, with respect to the two parcels 
on each end of the larger piece (R. 45), had overcome the 
Defendants' prima facie showing regarding the same by 
virtue of the Quitclaim Deed from Summit County (Tr. 
266). 
6. Trial Court's Determination of Just Compensation. 
Predicated upon the Court's determination of the own-
ership issue, the case proceeded to trial on the issues of 
Just Compenmtion. The Landoiwnel'IS produced lfu.ree wit-
nesses, all from Salt Lake City, whose opinions on the fair 
market value of the property condemned and the damages 
to the remainder were, respectively: 
Werner Kiepe 
(Tr. 605) 








The sole witness of the Road Commission was from 




The State's witness acknowledged that the highest and 
best use of the subject property for commercial purposes 
had been destroyed by reason of the condemnation acqui-
sition, that the sale of the remainder property would meet 
substantial buyer resistance, and that most of the commer-
cial improvements, i.e., service station, storage tanks, gaso-
line pumps, cabin sites and the predominant portion of the 
restaurant had only salvage value remaining (Tr. 662, 667, 
704, 725-726, 734). 
The Court found that by reason of the State expropri-
ation, the prime access to U. S. Highway 40 and the Park 
City roadway had been taken, that the property could no 
longer feasibly and economically be used for commercial 
purposes and that the highest and best use of the remnant 
property after condemnation was speculative and transi-
tional (R. 51). The Court determined that Just Compen-
sation for the acquisition and remainder damages was a 
compromise between the eviidence of ,fue Landowners and 
the State of $65,992.00 (R. 51). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
CONTRARY TO THE CLAIM OF STATE COUNSEL, 
THE ISSUE OF ADVERSE POSSESSION WAS NOT 
RAISED IN THE LOWER COURT AND IS NOT NOW 
HERE ON APPEAL. 
12 
The State rests its appeal in this case on the singular 
point that the Defendants did not make a case of adverse 
possesion. At the outset, therefore, it should be made very 
clear that this case does not involve, nor has it ever involved 
(as State's counsel would have the Court believe) any issue, 
question or claim of adverse possession by these Landown-
ers. The Landowners never rested their case on ownership 
of any of the property under consideration on any ethereal 
argument of adverse possession and the question was not 
debated, expressly or by innuendo, at any point of 1trial in 
the lower Court. The State's Brief misses the whole thrust 
of the Defendants' case on ownership. Their position was 
and is that open and continuous use, possession and claim 
to the 6.27 acres for better than 15 years under color of 
title is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of owner-
ship as against all others except for one who clariins and 
manifests a higher or better title. The record is beyond 
dispute that these owners had been for upwards of 20 
years in quiet and peaceable possession of the subject prop-
erty under color of title without any claimant having ever 
asserted any right, mtle or interest in and Ito the property. 
Thus the State was never confronted with the issue of 
adverse possession, or of who, as between two or more 
adverse claimants, was entitled to compensation. The la-
borious treatise of State counsel in his Brief on the elements 
of adverse possession, on the long recognized doctrine that 
adverse possession cannot be maintained as against the 
sovereign, and on the argument that these Landowners did 
not make a sufficient showing of adverse possession, totally 
I ....._ 
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misses the mark of the lower Court's ruling, ignores three 
days of testimony spent on the issue of ownership, and fails 
to even mention the authorities upon which the trial Judge 
obviously predicated his ruling. 
It is sufficient to note at this juncture that the title 
1Jo ithe property condemned by the State was lindispumbly 
vested in the Defendants. App. Br. p. 26. Accordingly, 
there was no question but that the State did acquire full 
record and posses•sory title and ownership to 'the property 
sought in the action. The only query was whether the De-
fendants had established an adequate showing of owner-
ship to the remaining property so as to entitle them to the 
recovery of damages which had been undeniably sustained. 
POINT II 
THE RULING OF THE COURT ON OWNERSHIP OF 
THE 6.27 ACRES WAS IN FULL ACCORDANCE 
WITH RULING CASE LAW. 
After better than a day of argument and proffers of 
proof on the part of both counsel, the trial Court quite suc-
cinctly announced the rule that would govern and control 
the resolution of the ownership question: 
"The Court is of the opinion that in the light 
of counsels' very comprehensive and enlightening 
opening statements, the Court should at this time 
find that there is an issue of title in the case, and 
that that issue should be met by defendants moving 
forward with their burden of proof; at least, Mr. 
Campbell, to the point of establishing quiet posses-
sion under some claim of ownership or color of title 
in the defendants. And then I believe that if that 
14 
burden is met by defendants, we can then determine 
whether the State has the witnesses that you refer 
to who can come before this Court and claim an 
interest in subject lands." (Tr. 57). 
By such ruling, the trial Judge recognized and followed 
the leading and only authority cited by the parties on the 
question, Nicho1ls on Eminent Domain. Nichols states the 
proposition to be that with respect to evidence of owner-
ship of land not condemned but claimed to have been dam-
aged by the condemnation: 
"It is accordingly quite generally the law that, 
in condemnation proceedings under authority of law, 
proof of possession under claim of title will be 
treated as prima facie evidence of ownership in fee, 
and will be sufficient to entitle the person in such 
possession to receive the compensation awarded for 
the land, if no one showing a better title lays claim 
to it." 
2 Nichoils on Eminent Domain 28, §5.2[3] 
The rationale of Judge Swan's ruling, uncontested as 
it was by the State, and the authoritative statement of 
Nichols are grounded upon the avoidance of imposing the 
otherwise intolerable hardship upon a land-condemnee of 
showing good title against all the world to severed property 
remaining after condemnation where the public records 
disclose the lack of a perfect chain of record title, along with 
possible clouds and stray instruments which have never 
been discharged, released, or abandoned. In a word, this 
well reasoned authority and ruling prevents a full scale 
trial of a quiet title action regarding property not con-
demned by the State, but rn!ther possessed, fenced and opeirly 
15 
occupied by the Defendants under clear color of title, which 
had sustained permanent damage and as to which no one 
had ever made any foreign claim prior to condemnation or 
at any time. 
Accordingly and to this end, the trial Court determined 
that Davies and LeSourd had the initial burden of estab-
lishing quiet, peaceable and undisturbed possession of the 
6.27 acres under color of title, and that thereupon, the State 
had the responsibility of producing claimants who bona 
fidely asserted an interest in such property as suggested by 
the spurious and unconnected documents on the records 
of the County Recorder. These landowners met and estab-
lished their burden of proof by showing such quiet, undis-
turbed and peaceab1le possession of the subject property 
shown in yellow on Exhibit 1 for better than 15 years under 
full color of title during which time no person whomsoever 
asserted any claim or interest against them. The State, on 
the other hand, failed to produce one witness, who asserted 
or would assert any claim in or to the property. Rather, 
it chose to fall back on a hodge-podge of unrelated, incon-
sistent, overlapping and ancient documents of record. It 
was just such an attempt on the part of the condemning 
agency in challenging the tite of the landowner which, but 
for such condemnation, would have obviously gone unchal-
lenged by anyone, to avoid the condemning agency's consti-
tutional and statutory obligation to pay full and just 
compensation which the Court attempted to mitigate by 
its ruling in the landmark decision of Perry v. Clissold, 
(1907) A.C. 73 (a case cited favorably in Nichols on Emi-
nent Domain Vol. 2 §5.2[3]) : 
16 
"It could hardly have been intended or con-
templated that the Act should have the affect of 
shaking titles which, but for the Act would have 
been secure, and would in the process of time be-
come absolute and indisputable, or lthat rthe Gov-
ernor, or responsible Ministers acting under his 
instructions should take advantage of the infirmiity 
of anybody's title in order to acquire his land for 
nothing." 
The rule in Perry is a corollary to the long established 
principal of the common law that a trespass is an injury 
to possession and that possession under claim of title is good 
as against aU the world except one actually claiming a su-
perior title. As a trespasser cannot def end against one in 
possession by proving that record title to the property is 
in a third party, neither can the condemning body in an 
eminent domain suit shirk its constitutional obligation to 
pay Just Compensation by attacking the title of a party 
in quiet and peaceable possession. Morrison v. Hinkson, 87 
Ill. 587 (1878); LaFayette v. Wortman, 107 Ind. 404, 8 NE 
277 (1886). This Court has followed the footstep authority 
of Perry as recognized in Nichols in the case of Ketchum 
Coal Company v. District Court of Carbon County, et al, 
48 Utah 432, 159 Pac. 737 ( 1916). Therein, it was held 
that a condemnor may not dispute a title of a party in 
possession, for the purposes of assessment of just compen-
sation, unless the condemnor, itself, holds or has acquired 
a paramount title to the land. Justice Frick, writing for an 
undivided Court, stated: 
"The condemning party cannot dispute the title 
of the party in pos1session, iagaJi.nsrt 1whom proceedings 
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have been instituted, unless such party had acquired 
a paramount title." 
1. Adverse Possession Againt the Sovereign Was Never 
an Issue in This Case. 
The prolonged argument of State counsel in Brief 
(pages 8-12) that ownership by adverse possession may not 
be acquired by a private individual vis-a-vis the sovereign 
is quite unnecessary to the disposition of this case. While 
such hornbook rule of law is accurately stated, it is, as 
noted in this Brief, plainly irrelevant to the issue of own-
ership before the trial Court and on appeal for the following 
reasons: 
(a) Adverse possession, as observed above, exists as an 
issue only between two or more parties, each of 
whom claim some interest in the same land. As 
against all others, one in possession has perfect title 
except as to another who actually asserts a recog-
nized paramount interest. 
(b) Judge Swan ruled that as to any property or parcels 
in which the State claimed and proved a recognized 
paramount interest, these Defendants had no right 
or interest therein even though the Defendants might 
otherwise have been in quiet, undisturbed and peace-
able possession; and thus, to the extent any issue of 
sovereignty was involved, the Court rwled in favor 
of the State. 
(c) The record is clear that neither the State Road Com-
mission, Summit County, or any other sovereign en-
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tity, claimed any right, title or interest in or to any 
part or portion of the remainder of land occupied 
and possessed by the Defendants. In fact, Summit 
County expressly diavowed and disclaimed any inter-
est in the subject land within the "old County road-
way" (Tr. 229-230). Consequently there were no 
adverse claims asserted by the sovereign upon which 
the trial Court was called upon to make a ruling. 
2. The Statute of Frauds i,s not Avail,able to the State 
Road Commission as a Defense. 
For the premiere time in this Proceeding, State coun-
sel in his Brief, raises the spurious contention that, some-
how, ithe State of Uita;h is e:ruti1:Jled to avail irbself of the 
defense or claim of the Statute of Frauds as against the 
possessory rights and interest under color of title of these 
Landowners. App. Br. page 15 para. 2. 
Never during this trial did the State argue that the 
Statute of Frauds, was even latently relevant. Nor did it 
affirmatively plead such defense as required by Rule 8 (c) 
U.R.C.P. Even if it had, the argument would have been 
abortive, for besides the elementary and overriding rule as 
staited by Nichols, supra and this Court in Ketchum Coal Co., 
supra, it is blackletter law that the Statute of Frauds, 25-
5-1 U.C.A. 1953, is a personal defense available only to a 
party to a parol contract and cannot be seized upon by an 
unrelated third party. Demeter v. Annenson, 180 P.2d 998 
(Cal. 1947); Powell v. Leon, 239 P.2d 974, (Kan. 1952); 
Forrester v. Rock Island Oil & Refining Co., 323 P.2d 597, 
(Mont. 1957); Dodge v. Davies, 179 P.2d 735, (Ore. 1947). 
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Under the penumbra of events surrounding the owner-
ship of the subject property, the Road Commission was not 
a party to any of the transactions that occurred prior to 
condemnation and its unprecedented claim to the protection 
of the Statute of Frauds flies in the face of sound and estab-
lished principals of common law. 
3. The Rulings of the Trial Court were Consistent and 
Comported with the Evidence and the Ru"le of the Case. 
State counsel goes to the bottom of the well to urge, 
on page 16 of his Brief, that the trial Court made 
sistent determinations in ruling on the one hand, that land 
granted to the State Road Commission via the Summit 
County Quitclaim Deed was vested in the State, while at 
the same time holding on the other hand that the ownership 
of land under the "old County road" was, for purposes of 
the eminent domain trial, vested in these Defendants by vir-
tue of their continuous, quiet, undisturbed and peaceable 
possession. 
Any reasonable examination of the record quickly illus-
trates that the trial Court did not make inconsistent rulings 
as claimed by the State. What Judge Swan did say was 
that to the extent that the State Road Commission had 
record fee title stemming from a Quitclaim Deed from Sum-
mit County, such title was paramount to the possessory 
ownership and the clouded record title of the Defendants. 
However, as to the 6.27 acres determined to be in the own-
ership of these Defendants, the State did not nor could it 
assert a paramount record interest and Summit County, 
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appearing through its County Attorney resolved any doubt 
on the subject by expressly disclaiming any such paramount 
interest. Judge Swan's determination, on the facts adduced, 
was, therefore, quite consistent with the enunciated rule 
that the Defendants' possessory ownership, based upon quiet 
and undisturbed possession together with bona fide color 
of title, was good against all with the world with exception 
of a party actually asserting a determined superior right. 
Such conclusionary ruling is in complete accord with the 
manifest case law prevalent in a quiet title action, viz., a 
disclaimer or non-appearance by a recorded interest negates 
any legal force or validity which such interest might other-
wise have. Herein, not only did Summit County expressly 
disclaim any interest in the former County roadway, but 
the former Chairman of the Summit County Commission, 
Archie Pace, testified that Summit County resolved and 
agreed in 1965 to abandon the alignment of the old road. 
'The argument of State counsel on this point is un-
worthy of this Court's consideration. 
POINT III 
THE LEGAL PRINCIPAL OF UNITY OF OWNER-
SHIP AND UNITY OF USE IN EMINENT DOMAIN 
ARE NOT HERE AT ISSUE. 
State counsel urges that under the facts of the case 
at Bar, or at least his version, these landowners have failed 
to show unity of ownership and unity of use of the total 
property before condemnation. See App. Br. pp. 16-22. The 
argument is made with such anxiety that it by-passes the 
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admi1tted and uncorutrovel'lted fact that the property con-
demned, as well as the 1land underlying all of the commercial 
improvements were under the common ownership of Davies 
and LeSourd. 5 The contention of the lack of unity of own-
ership and use presupposes on the State's part that the 
trial Court erred in its rulings on the issue of ownership 
and that consequently there were at least five separate pal.'1-
cels under five separate ownerships. That is the best that 
can be said of State counsel's argument. 
If the lower Court in this case is correct in its initial 
and ultimate rulings of ownership (which clearly it was), 
then the conclusion is required that the subject property 
met the ordinary tests of unity of ownership, unity of use 
and unity of possession. While State counsel in his recita-
tion of case authority is something less than completely 
candid in his statement of the fact in Mcintyre v. Board of 
County Commissioners, 211 P.2d 59 (Kan. 1949), and San 
Benito County v. Copper Mountain Mining Company, 45 
P .2d 428 (Cal. 1935), we have no quarrel with the recog-
nized legal maxim that in a partial taking case, there must 
be unity of ownership and actual or probable potential use 
between the land taken and the land remaining. 6 But we 
need not resort to authority from Kansas, California or 
sAnd it was with respect to this land, title to which was not in 
dispute herein, that predominately all severance damage was predi-
cated (Tr. 419, 667, 693). 
Glt is of importance to note that without exception, all the cases 
cited by State counsel in support of the proposition of unity of own-
ership involved two or more adverse claimants, asserting adverse 
ownership :(n two or more separate parcels or arose out of a circum-
stance where ownership admittedly was vested in the condemnee and a 
third person. Such were not the facts of the instant case. 
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other jurisdictions for such pristine concepts. Justice Cal-
lister stated the proposition as well as anyone in setting out 
the facts of State of Utah v. W£lliams, et al, 22 U.2d 301, 
452 P .2d 548 ( 1969) , and this Court addressed itself to the 
question in some detail in North Salt Lake v. St. Joseph 
Water and Irrigation Company, 118 Utah 600, 223 P.2d 577, 
584 (1950). 
Thus while time need not be lost in rebutting a doc-
trine, the correctness of which is uncontested, the relevant 
application of that doctrine to the facts at hand is quite an-
other thing. The best evidence that the issue is not appro-
priately under consideration herein, is the Plaintiff's own 
Brief, for after rendering forth a role call of cases from 
foreign jurisdictions, its argument on the point peters out 
and is exhausted on page 22 of Apellant's Brief without any 
attempt to tie it or apply it to the subject property or the 
case at Bar. It is gainsaid that the term "owner" in general 
real property parlance and in eminent domain proceedings 
specifically, includes any person who has a legal or equit-
able interest in the land condemned or the remaining prop-
erty. 2 Nichols of Eminent Domain §5.2[1] and authorities 
therein cited; Campbell v. New Haven, 101 Conn. 173, 125 
Atl. 650 (1924); Knoth v. Barclay, 8 Colo. 300, 6 Pac. 924 
(1885). 78-34-7 of the Eminent Domain Code particularly 
describes an owner as one being in occupation of the prop-
erty. While possession alone obviously is not sufficient for 
the establishment of a compensable interest in a condem-
nation suit, 7 the facts of this case clearly illustrate an inter-
7For example, a tenant at will, tenant at sufferance or mere parol 
licensee. 
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est in the subject property far beyond such minimal rela-
tion. As indicated herein, trial Court rulings on the owner-
ship of Davies and LeSourd are fully sustained. 
The claim of State counsel that there was a lack of 
showing of unity of use in this case, because the landowners 
had not applied every square inch of their property to the 
commercial operation is clearly esoteric; in fact, the claim 
misconceives the "concept of unity of use" altogether. The 
rule is so well established in this jurisdiction by a legion 
of cases that we need not belabor the question with author-
ity that market value and highest and best use in eminent 
domain are based upon not only the actual use being made 
of the property in question but as well the potential uses 
to which the property may be probably placed in the fore-
seeable future. The fact, therefore, that a portion of the 
total property was, at the date the sheriff served his Sum-
mons, lying idle does not alter the clearly promulgated defi-
nition of unity of use in the Case. After nearly a week of 
trial, the evidence on both sides was unqualified, that the 
total property of the Defendants, prior to condemnation, 
had a similar highest and best unity of use, viz., commercial. 
The claim of the State on this point is incongruous. 
POINT IV 
THE DEFENDANT LANDOWNERS CLEARLY MET 
THEIR BURDEN OF PROOF ON ALL PHASES OF 
THE CASE. 
Lastly, the State charges under Point II of its Brief, 
that the Defendant-landowners failed in their burden of 
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proof regarding ownership and the right to severance dam-
age. The charge is followed by a recitation of Utah cases, 
of value to this question only in showing that State coun-
sel may have had occasion at on8 time or another, to read 
them. Particular emphasis 1is put upon this Court's decision 
in State of Utah v. Tedesco, 4 U.2d 31, 286 P.2d 785 (1955), 
wherein it was held that as between two disputing cwimants 
in property actuaUy condemned by the State for "This is 
the Place Monument" in Salt Lake County, the claimant 
urging an interest by virtue of a parol contract must sus-
tain such interest by "clear and convincing evidence." The 
rule of Tedesco is inapposite herein for such rule, pertain-
ing to an oral and non-possessory estate in land, has nothing 
to do with the positive proof of the Defendants herein of 
quiet, peaceable and undisturbed possession of property 
under color of title not of just the land condemned, but of 
the remainder land as well. 
The measuring rod required of a landowner in meeting 
his burden of proof for entitlement to severance damage 
has been raised by Road Commission special counsel in four 
recent ca;ses: State of Utah v. Howes, et al., 20 U.2d 246, 
436 P.2d 803 (1968); StaW, of Utah v. Style-Crete, Inc.,. 20 
U.2d 365, 438 P.2d 537 (1968); State of Utah v. Bingham 
Gas & Ou Co.,. 21 U.2d 66, 440 P.2d 260 (1968); 'and State 
of Utah v. Williams, et al., supra; and 1Jhe Court has in 
each case responded in olear and convirroing fashion. The 
ruling law is thus clear tJhat a citizen, whose property is 
condemned, is under no onerous burden of proving sever-
ance damage by "clear and convincing evidence," but rather, 
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is required to satisfy only the ordinary "preponderance of 
the evidence" rule. The State continues to raise the ques..; 
tion and this Court continues to answer it in the same way. 
CONCLUSION 
The attempt of State counsel in this Appeal to disguise 
the issues raised and the facts as presented at trial under 
the untried question of adverse possesion is ill fated in this 
Court. The contention was never made by the Defendants 
nor was it the subject of any debate or issue before Judge 
Swan. It should not now be the target for the first time 
on appeal. In Re Ekker's Estate, 19 U.2d 414, 432 P.2d 45 
(1967); Riter v. Cayias, 19 U.2d 358, 431 P.2d 788 (1967). 
The Landowners' case on ownership, predicated upon un-
disturbed, peaceable and quiet possession of the subject 
property for 15 years under color of title, satisfied the 
uncontested case authority, warranted the ruling of the 
trial Court, and dictated that the case proceed on to the 
issues of Just Compensation. The State has raised no issue 
in this Appeal with respect to the adequacy of proof on the 
issues of market value and/or severance damage to support 
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment as 
entered. The proof of ownership was not overcome by the 
State's proffer of indiscriminate, inconsistent and stray 
documents in the public records. 
After better than six days of comprehensive trial on 
all the issues, the Judgment as entered, premised upon 
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fully adequate Findings and Conclusions should be, we do 
respectfully submit, upheld and affirmed by this Court in 
all respects. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. 
STEWART M. HANSON, JR. 
Attorneys for Defendants-
Respondents 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 
